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EXHAUSTED WITH THE JUDICIARY:
DEFERENTIAL OVERSIGHT AND THE NEED FOR
CERTAINTY IN AN UNCERTAIN TIME: RASUL V.
BUSH, 124 S. CT. 2686 (2004)
Adam J. Gentile∗

I.

INTRODUCTION

Nothing is certain during military conflict. The best-laid plans
change at a moments notice. Decisions are made quickly and decisively.
The foremost concern is military success, not the Constitution. The war on
terror is no different. Warfare in the 21st century does not resemble the
wars our fathers fought. The enemy is new and unconventional. The
theater for military action is not confined to territorial borders or identified
by the colors of a hostile nation. The battle against terror after September
11, 2001, is an unknown challenge, fought in all corners of the globe.1 It
has been said that in order to meet the new challenges facing our nation and
our freedom, the executive branch must be able to exercise its
constitutionally authorized power to wage war free from unnecessary
interference by the judiciary.2 Still, we must be mindful of the freedoms
and liberties that we defend.
In Rasul v. Bush, the Court was forced to decide between deference
to executive decisions during a time of war and the protection of civil
liberties that are foundational to our free society.3 The issue was whether
the United States District Courts have jurisdiction to entertain challenges
about the detention of enemy foreign nationals captured abroad and
incarcerated at Cuba’s Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.4 The Court held that
jurisdiction exists,5 reversing both the United States District Court6 and

∗

Staff Writer, 2004-05, University of Dayton Law Review. J.D. expected, May 2006, University of
Dayton School of Law; B.A., 1999, State University of New York at Plattsburgh.
1
Rasul v. Bush (“Rasul II”), 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 68 n. 13 (D.D.C. 2002) (stating that “[t]he United
States confronts an untraditional war that presents unique challenges in identifying a nebulous enemy.
In earlier times when the United States was at war, discerning ‘the enemy’ was far easier than today”).
2
Shira A. Scheindlin & Matthew L. Schwartz, With All Due Deference: Judicial Responsibility in a
Time of Crisis, 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 795, 796 (2004) (presenting the different answers to the question of
“what . . . is the standard by which a judge should review executive or legislative actions taken in
wartime?”).
3
Rasul v. Bush (“Rasul”), 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
4
Id. at 2690.
5
Id. at 2698.
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.7
This Note will argue that the Supreme Court in Rasul did not
consider its holding’s effect on the United States’ ability to conduct military
operations in the war on terror and all future conflicts involving the United
States. Part II of this Note sets forth the background of Rasul, the context
in which it was decided, and outlines the holding of the Court in detail.
Part III argues that the Court should have deferred to executive decisionmaking during wartime, by adopting the principles found in the exhaustion
doctrine, while protecting petitioner’s rights. Part III further argues that
while the Rasul decision may have been correct, the Court should have
refused to hear petitioners’ claims until all of their remedies under
international law had been exhausted.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Factual Background

On September 11, 2001, members of Al Qaeda8 hijacked four
commercial airplanes.9 The planes were used as missiles, striking at the
heart of America’s political, financial, and military centers.10 Almost 3,000
people were killed in the terrorist attacks.11 The United States reacted
swiftly and decisively, launching military action against the Al Qaeda
terrorist network and the Taliban12 in Afghanistan.13 The military action in
Afghanistan was authorized by a joint resolution14 of the United States

6

Rasul II, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 55.
Al Odah v. U.S., 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
8
Al Qaeda is a global terrorist network led by Osama Bin Laden, a Saudi Arabian citizen by birth.
9
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2690.
10
Id. One of the airplanes hit the Pentagon; two of the planes hit New York City’s World Trade Center.
News reports have suggested that the target of the fourth airplane would have been the United States
Capital Building or the White House. The fourth airplane crashed into a barren field in Pennsylvania
due to the heroism of the passengers who attempted to retake control of the airplane from the terrorists.
11
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2690. 2,830 people were killed in the attack on the World Trade Center; 189
killed in the attack on the Pentagon; 44 people were killed on United Airlines Flight 93 which crashed in
Pennsylvania.
12
The Taliban was the ruling government in Afghanistan at the time of the September 11, 2001 attacks
on the United States.
13
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2690.
14
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, §§ 1-2, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). The Joint
Resolution reads as follows: “To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against those
responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States. Whereas, on September 11, 2001,
acts of treacherous violence were committed against the United States and its citizens; and Whereas,
such acts render it both necessary and appropriate that the United States exercise its rights to selfdefense and to protect United States citizens both at home and abroad; and Whereas, in light of the
threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States posed by these grave acts of
violence; and Whereas, such acts continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national
security and foreign policy of the United States; and Whereas, the President has authority under the
Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States:
Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This joint resolution may be cited as the
"Authorization for Use of Military Force.” SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED
STATES ARMED FORCES. (a) In General.− That the President is authorized to use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
7
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Congress, which allowed the President to use “all necessary and appropriate
force” against those involved in the September 11, 2001 attacks on the
United States.15
During these hostilities, the United States captured and detained
members of Al Qaeda, the Taliban regime and people who had taken up
arms against the United States Military and its coalition16 partners.17
Among those captured and detained were petitioners in the present case.18
The detainees were originally held in Afghanistan.19 After a prison uprising
took the life of a United States Central Intelligence Agent, military and
administration officials made the decision to move the detainees to the
United States Naval Base20 in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.21 While in
Guantanamo Bay, it was alleged that detainees were not permitted to
consult with counsel, were denied contact with their families, and as of the
date of this action, had not been charged with any crime or brought before
any court or military tribunal.22
By Presidential Order, the detainees were classified as enemy or
unlawful combatants23, and were to be tried before military tribunals.24

committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United
States by such nations, organizations or persons. (b) War Powers Resolution Requirements.− (1)
Specific statutory authorization.− Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the
Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the
meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution. (2) Applicability of other requirements.−
Nothing in this resolution supercedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.” See also Al
Odah, 321 F.3d at 1136.
15
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2690.
16
The United States was joined in the war effort by other countries including Great Britain and Spain.
17
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2690.
18
Id.
19
K. Elizabeth Dahlstrom, Student Author, Between Empire and Community: The United States and
Multilateralism 2001-2003: A Mid-Term Assessment: Humanitarian Law: The Executive Policy
toward Detention and Trial of Foreign Citizens at Guantanamo Bay, 21 Berkeley J. Intl. L. 662, 673-74
(2003).
20
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2690-91. The base is within the sovereign territory of Cuba pursuant to a 1903
lease executed between the governments of the United States and Cuba. Under the terms of the lease
agreement, Cuba retains ultimate sovereignty of the leased area even though the United States has
complete jurisdiction and control. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of
Cuba for the Lease (Subject to Terms to be Agreed Upon by the Two Governments) to the United States
of Lands in Cuba for Coaling and Naval Stations, art. III, (Feb. 16, 1903), T.S. No. 418 [hereinafter
Lease of Lands]. A modification to the lease in 1934 provides that “absent an agreement to modify or
abrogate the lease, the lease would remain in effect ‘[s]o long as the United States of America shall not
abandon the naval . . . station of Guantanamo.’” Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2691 (quoting Treaty Defining
Relations with Cuba, art. III (May 29, 1934), T.S. No. 866 [hereinafter Relations with Cuba]).
21
Dahlstrom, supra n. 19, at 673-674 (“In November 2001, a violent prison uprising among detained
Afghan soldiers resulted in the widely-publicized death of CIA agent Michael Spann, the first known
American casualty in the conflict. This incident, in part, prompted the government to begin transporting
captives to locations outside of Afghanistan to better ensure the safety of United States military
personnel.”).
22
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2691.
23
An enemy combatant is defined as “[a] combatant captured and detained while serving in a hostile
force during open warfare. In general, the separation-of-powers doctrine prevents a [United States]
civilian court from interfering with the military’s handling of enemy combatants, at least as long as the
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Procedural Background

The case before the Supreme Court in Rasul was a consolidation of
two actions, Rasul v. Bush and Al Odah v. United States.25 The Rasul
petitioners filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on February 19, 2002.26
The petition was filed on behalf of three detainees by their relatives after
the United States District Court of the Central District of California
dismissed a similar action27 for lack of standing.28 The detainees in Rasul
are two citizens of the United Kingdom and one Australian.29 The petition
requested the following relief: release from unlawful custody; access to
counsel; and cessation of all interrogation during litigation.30 The Al Odah
petitioners filed their action on May 1, 2002.31 The detainees in Al Odah
are twelve Kuwaiti nationals.32 The Al Odah plaintiffs requested that the
court issue a preliminary and permanent injunction that would allow access
to counsel and their families, inform them of any charges against them, and
provide them with access to the courts or an impartial tribunal.33
Respondents in Rasul and Defendants in Al Odah filed motions to
dismiss based on jurisdictional grounds.34 The district court consolidated
the cases to rule on the jurisdictional question in both cases before
proceeding to assess each case on the merits.35
C.

The Lower Court Decisions

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
construed both actions as petitions for habeas corpus relief.36 On the
question of jurisdiction, the court found the Supreme Court ruling in

hostilities continue. An enemy combatant may be detained without charge and does not have the right
to legal representation.” Black’s Law Dictionary 283 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed., West 2004).
24
Dahlstrom, supra n. 19, at 672-73; see also Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in
the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 16, 2001) [hereinafter November 13 Order].
25
Rasul II, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 58-59.
26
Id. at 57.
27
See Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
28
Rasul II, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 57. “Standing is the determination of whether a specific person is the
proper party to bring a matter to the court for adjudication.” Standing is a tool used by the court to pay
deference to the other branches of government. It “promotes separation of powers by restricting the
availability of judicial review.” Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies, ch. 2,
§ 2.5.1, 60 (2d ed., Aspen 2002).
29
Rasul II, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 57.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 58.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 59.
36
Id. at 64. The Plaintiffs in Al Odah attempted to have the case considered as a request for a
preliminary and permanent injunction to compel certain government actions, and not as a petition for
Habeas Corpus requesting relief in the form of release from custody. Stating that the Plaintiffs “plainly
challenge the lawfulness of their custody,” the court held that “a petition for writ of habeas corpus is the
exclusive avenue for relief.” Id. at 62, 64.
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Johnson v. Eisentrager37 controlling and dismissed both cases for lack of
jurisdiction.38 The court relied on Johnson’s distinction between citizens
and aliens and its holding of presence within the sovereign territory of the
United States as key factors in determining whether a district court of the
United States has jurisdiction to hear petitions for a writ under 28 U.S.C. §
2241.39 The court found that one of two criteria must be met under Johnson
in order for the court to have jurisdiction.40 First, the court could exercise
jurisdiction over any Petitioner or Plaintiff who was a citizen of the United
States.41 Second, the presence of any Petitioner or Plaintiff within the
sovereign territory of the United States would confer jurisdiction on the
court.42 Since no Petitioner or Plaintiff was a United States citizen or was
present at any time within the sovereign territory of the United States, the
court could not consider the petitions on the merits and dismissed both
cases with prejudice.43
Petitioners and Plaintiff attempted to advance a theory of de facto
sovereignty by the United States over the Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay

37
339 U.S. 763 (1950). In Johnson, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
entertained a petition for writs of habeas corpus filed by non-citizens who were captured and detained
oversees near the end of World War II. The Johnson detainees were German citizens who were
captured in China while spying against the United States after the end of hostilities with Germany. The
detainees were tried and convicted by a United States Military commission in China. Following the
trial, the prisoners were transferred to the control of the United States Army in Germany, where they
were to serve their sentence in Landsberg Prison. The Supreme Court in Johnson reversed the Court of
Appeals and held that the court did not have jurisdiction over non-citizens who are held outside of the
sovereign territory of the United States.
38
Rasul II, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 65.
39
Id. at 65-73. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000) reads as follows: “Power to grant writ (a) Writs of habeas
corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions. The order of a circuit judge shall be entered in the records of
the district court of the district wherein the restraint complained of is had. (b) The Supreme Court, any
justice thereof, and any circuit judge may decline to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus
and may transfer the application for hearing and determination to the district court having jurisdiction to
entertain it. (c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless-- (1) He is in custody
under or by color of the authority of the United States or is committed for trial before some court
thereof; or (2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an
order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the United States; or (3) He is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States; or (4) He, being a citizen of a
foreign state and domiciled therein is in custody for an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title,
authority, privilege, protection, or exemption claimed under the commission, order or sanction of any
foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity and effect of which depend upon the law of nations; or
(5) It is necessary to bring him into court to testify or for trial. (d) Where an application for a writ of
habeas corpus is made by a person in custody under the judgment and sentence of a State court of a
State which contains two or more Federal judicial districts, the application may be filed in the district
court for the district wherein such person is in custody or in the district court for the district within
which the State court was held which convicted and sentenced him and each of such district courts shall
have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain the application. The district court for the district wherein such
an application is filed in the exercise of its discretion and in furtherance of justice may transfer the
application to the other district court for hearing and determination.”
40
Rasul II, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 68.
41
Id. at 65-66.
42
Id. at 72-73.
43
Id.
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based on the nature of the lease44 between the United States and Cuba.45 In
rejecting this argument, the court relied on the specific language of the
Naval Base lease, which states that “the United States recognizes the
continuance of the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over [the
leased areas].”46
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, the court affirmed the decision of the District Court.47
D.

The Decision of the United States Supreme Court

On November 10, 2004, the Supreme Court granted certiorari,
limiting the question considered to “[w]hether United States courts lack
jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of the
foreign nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities and
incarcerated at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba.”48
On the narrow question presented, a majority of the Court held that
the District Court had jurisdiction over Petitioners’ habeas actions,
reversing the decision of both the District Court and the Court of Appeals.49
The Court began with an examination of the historical origins of the writ of
habeas corpus to support its holding.50 It then compared the factual
situation of petitioners to those in Johnson51 and discussed Johnson’s effect
in terms of jurisdiction conferred by statute and jurisdiction conferred by
the Constitution.52 Finally, the Court reviewed the nature of the lease
between the United States and Cuba53 and found that statutory jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 224154 does exist because the United States exercises
plenary and exclusive jurisdiction over the Naval Base in Guantanamo
Bay.55
1.

History of the Writ

The Court stated that “[a]t its historical core, the writ of habeas
corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive
detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been

44
See Lease of Lands and Relations with Cuba, supra n. 20 (describing the specifics of the lease
between the United States and Cuba).
45
Rasul II, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 69.
46
Id.; see also Lease of Lands, supra n. 20.
47
Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1145.
48
Rasul v. Bush (“Rasul III”), 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003).
49
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2692.
50
Id.; see infra pt. II(D)(1), nn. 56-57 and accompanying text (discussing the historical origins of the
writ of habeas corpus).
51
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2693.
52
Id. at 2693-96; see infra pt. II(D)(2), nn. 58-63 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of
Johnson).
53
Id. at 2696.
54
28 U.S.C. § 2241; supra n. 39 (for full reproduction of the statute).
55
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2699; see infra pt. II(D)(3), nn. 64-68 and accompanying text (discussing the
basis for statutory jurisdiction).
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strongest.”56 The Court then found that the protections afforded by the writ
have conferred power upon the courts to entertain such petitions in times of
war and peace.57
2.

Constitutional Entitlement: The Effect of Johnson on Rasul
Petitioners

The Court concluded that the Rasul Petitioners are differently
situated from Petitioners in Johnson because: 1) they have not been tried
and convicted by any court or tribunal; 2) they are not citizens of any
country at war with the United States; 3) they deny they were involved in
acts of aggression against the United States; and 4) they have been held
where the United States “exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control.”58
Additionally, in analyzing Johnson, the Court found that the decision went
towards the “constitutional entitlement” of the writ, rather than any
statutory basis for jurisdiction.59 The only statement regarding statutory
jurisdiction by the Court in Johnson was that “[n]othing in the text of the
Constitution extends such a right [to habeas review], nor does anything in
our statutes.”60 Finding that Johnson controlled only Constitutional
entitlement61 to the writ, the contention of respondents, that Johnson
controlled the question of jurisdiction, was rejected.62 In the opinion of the
Supreme Court, the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2241, along with the nature of
the Naval Base lease, controlled the question presented for review.63
3.

Plenary and Exclusive Jurisdiction as a Basis for Statutory
Jurisdiction

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which sets forth the power to grant writs of
habeas corpus, states that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may be granted by the
Supreme Court, . . . the district courts and any circuit judge within their
respective jurisdictions.”64 The key to jurisdiction pursuant to statute is

56

Id. at 2692 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (1953)).
Id. at 2692-2693. It is worth noting that in the three cases the court cites for the proposition that the
power to review habeas petitions in a time of war exists, the petitioners were all, at one time, located
within the territory of the United States or one of its “insular possessions.” See Ex parte Milligan, 71
U.S. 2 (1866) (where petitioner was a citizen of the United States); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)
(where petitioners were held within the United States); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (where
petitioner was located within the Philippines at the time that it was a United States possession).
58
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2693 (stating that in Johnson, the court refused to find jurisdiction over
“prisoner[s] of our military authorities . . . [who are] (a) enemy alien[s]; (b) [have] never been or resided
in the United States; (c) [were] captured outside of our territory and there held in military custody as . . .
prisoner[s] of war; (d) [were] tried and convicted by a Military Commission sitting outside the United
States; (e) for offenses against laws of war committed outside the United States; (f) and [are] at all times
imprisoned outside of the United States”).
59
Id.
60
Id. at 2694; Johnson, 339 U.S. at 768.
61
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2693-2694.
62
Id. at 2695.
63
Id. at 2698.
64
28 U.S.C. § 2241; supra n. 39 (for full reproduction of statute).
57
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presence within the jurisdiction of a court of the United States.65 Having
found that the concept of presence within the sovereign territory of the
United States as defined in Johnson went only towards constitutional
jurisdiction,66 the Court looked at the text of the Naval Base lease which
“[b]y the express terms of [the] agreement” grants “complete jurisdiction
and control” to the United States for an indefinite time.67 On this basis,
along with the presence of Petitioner’s custodians within the jurisdiction of
the Court, the decisions of the lower courts were reversed.68
III.

ANALYSIS

This Note will argue that the Rasul Court should have applied, at a
minimum, a diminished standard of review to the petitions of the
Guantanamo detainees, giving some consideration to the concept of judicial
deference to the Executive in wartime decision-making, while still
protecting the detainees’ rights to be free from illegal restraint. As it
stands, the Court’s ruling made an uncertain situation even more difficult.
Our military commanders must now choose between the safety of our
troops and nation on one side, and judicial interference in military affairs on
the other. While the Court has a role to play in protecting the civil liberties
of the detainees, a compromise could have been fashioned that would have
balanced the war effort against these civil liberties.
The argument for application of a diminished standard of review is
supported by the rationale underlying the concept of judicial deference.
Exercising judicial deference in this situation is justified by the
Constitution,69 the history of the Court’s decisions in wartime,70 and by the
authority under which the decision to hold the detainees at the Naval Base
in Guantanamo Bay was made.71 This Note argues that the long-standing
doctrine of exhaustion should have been employed by the Court in order to
balance deference to the Executive with the Court’s role in protecting civil
liberties.72 A compromise utilizing the exhaustion doctrine would have
paid due deference to the executive’s role in conducting the military affairs
of the nation by requiring that the petitioners exhaust all remedies for

65

Presence with the jurisdiction of the court includes that of the petitioner or petitioner’s custodian. See
Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494-495 (1973) (holding that “[t]he writ of habeas
corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him” and that
jurisdiction under § 2241(a) exists as long as “the custodian can be reached by service of process”).
66
See supra pt. II(D)(2) (discussing the Court’s finding regarding constitutional entitlement versus
statutory entitlement to the writ of habeas corpus).
67
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2696; see also Lease of Lands, supra n. 20.
68
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2699.
69
Infra pt. III(A)(1).
70
Infra pt. III(A)(2).
71
In the November 13 Order, President Bush bases the decision on “the authority vested in me as
President and as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States by the Constitution and
the laws of the United States of America, including the Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint
Resolution (Public Law 107-40, 115 Stat. 224) and sections 821 and 836 of title 10, United States
Code.” See November 13 Order, supra n. 24, at 57833.
72
Infra pt. III(B).
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challenging their detention under international law. This compromise
would leave the determination of petitioners’ rights to the body of law
specifically applicable to the conduct, responsibilities, and duties of nations
at war; a body of law under which the petitioners have remedies available.73
By adopting the exhaustion doctrine, the Court would ultimately retain the
right to review the detention of the Rasul petitioners as a final resort,
ensuring that it can live up to its Constitutional duties, while respecting the
Constitutional authority of the Executive in wartime decision-making.
A.

Justification of Deference to Executive Wartime Decision-Making

Constitutional grants of authority create the difficult question of
determining when the Court should defer to the Executive.74 Many answers
have been given to the question of deference in wartime, ranging from
complete “non-deferential review”75 to complete deference in wartime,76
with most courts settling on a diminished standard of review.77 The
majority opinion in Rasul never mentions judicial deference.78 The only
consideration given to the Executive’s Constitutional authority is in the
concurring opinion.79 In Rasul, the majority of the Court ignored the
approach “traditionally adopted by American courts,”80 and entered the
United States into a “suicide pact”81 that threatened to undermine the ability
of the Executive to protect the country from the new threats we face.82
Instead of ignoring the concept of deference, the Court, while keeping an
eye on the rights of the detainees, should have reviewed the detention of
petitioners with a higher level of deference to those branches that are
constitutionally and historically authorized in making and executing war.

73
See infra pt. III(B)(3), nn. 120-130 and accompanying text (discussing the remedies available under
international law).
74
See generally U.S. Const.
75
Scheindlin, supra n. 2, at 796. Complete non-deferential review during wartime has been rejected by
the court on numerous occasions. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) (stating
“while the Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact”).
76
Scheindlin, supra n. 2, at 796 (stating that complete deference in wartime is unacceptable because it
creates unacceptable precedents after the war has ended). While it may be true that complete deference
to the Executive in wartime has created unacceptable precedents, see Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214
(1944), the precedents set in such times can be viewed as only applying during wartime which would
restrict the use of such precedents in times of peace.
77
Scheindlin, supra n. 2, at 796.
78
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. 2686 at pages where majority opinion located.
79
Id. at 2700 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that prior decisions have recognized “a realm of political
authority over military affairs where the judicial power may not enter”).
80
Scheindlin, supra n. 2, at 796.
81
Id.; see supra n. 75.
82
Since the ruling in Rasul, the government began releasing some of the Guantanamo detainees to avoid
having to justify their decision-making before the court. As a result, some enemy combatants who are
hostile to the United States have been returned to the battlefield and have continued their aggression
against the United States. One released detainee, Abdullah Mehsud, was the mastermind behind the
kidnapping of two Chinese nationals. At least two other detainees who have been released have
rejoined the fight against American interests. See Tim McGirk, After Gitmo, Back to Terror, Time Mag.
24, 24 (Oct. 25, 2004).
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Constitutional Justification of the Traditional Approach

Deference to the political branches during military conflict is
justified by the text of the Constitution. “The President shall be
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States[.]”83 “He
shall have Power . . . to make Treaties[.]”84 “The Congress shall have
power . . . To declare War . . . To raise and support Armies . . . To provide
and maintain a Navy[.]”85 These words specifically allocate authority over
military affairs to the Executive and Legislative branches of the
government.86
By contrast, judicial Constitutional authority in the area of war
powers is limited, if it exists at all.87 “The judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court.”88 “The judicial Power shall
extend to all Cases . . . arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties.”89 While this grant of authority to the judicial
branch implies oversight of Executive and Legislative decision-making,
“[n]o provision [of the Constitution] explicitly authorizes the federal courts
to intervene in war powers questions.”90 The absence of any explicit
judicial war making authority justifies the approach “traditionally adopted
by American courts.”91
2.

Historical Justification

Historically, courts have shown great deference to decisions of the
political branches of the government in times of war.92 Relying on
doctrines including political questions, separation of powers, and ripeness
and by refusing to grant certiorari, the Court has avoided becoming
involved in war-power disputes.93 In Marbury v. Madison, the Court stated
that “[q]uestions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution
and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.”94
The language of the Constitution shows that questions of war and peace

83

U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl.1.
Id. at cl. 2.
85
Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 11-13.
86
John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War
Powers, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 167, 175 (1996).
87
Id. at 176.
88
U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
89
Id. at § 2, cl.1.
90
Yoo, supra n. 86, at 176.
91
Scheindlin, supra n. 2, at 796.
92
Id.
93
See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics
111-198 (2d ed., Yale University Press 1962). Collectively referred to as justiciability questions, these
doctrines are often invoked by the court to avoid conflict between the equal but separate branches of
government. “[J]usticiability doctrines define the judicial role; they determine when it is appropriate for
the federal courts to review a matter and when it is necessary to defer to the other branches of
government.” Chemerinsky, supra n. 28, at ch. 2, § 2.3, 50.
94
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803).
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have been submitted to the Executive and Legislative branches.95
While the Court has never completely refused to hear cases
challenging the decisions of the Executive,96 the Court has set a high
standard for setting aside such decisions made pursuant to constitutionally
authorized war powers.97 In this regard, the Court has stated that the
detention of enemy combatants “ordered by the President in the declared
exercise of his powers as Commander in Chief of the Army in time of war
and grave public danger – are not to be set aside by the courts without the
clear conviction that they are in conflict with the Constitution.”98
Additionally, courts considering questions of judicial deference in
wartime start with the assumption that the decisions of the political
branches, which restrain civil liberties during wartime, are narrowly
tailored to balance civil liberties with wartime needs.99 In Ex parte Mitsuye
Endo, the Court stated: “In interpreting a wartime measure we must assume
that [the Congress’ and the Chief Executive’s] purpose was to allow for the
greatest possible accommodation between [civil] liberties and the
exigencies of war.”100 Judicial deference in Rasul would have been
historically justified by combining the assumption that the political
branches of the government are sensitive to civil liberties in wartime, with
the Court’s historical acknowledgment of the separate powers within the
government.
3.

Present Day Justification

Deference to the wartime powers of the President is justified under
the circumstances surrounding the decision to hold the petitioners at the
Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay. The current military action and the
decision to hold detainees at the Naval Base was undertaken pursuant to the
President’s Constitutional war-power as Commander in Chief and under a
joint resolution of Congress, which authorized military force.101 Thus, the
two branches exercised their authority provided by the Constitution’s war–
powers.102 The Legislative branch authorized the use of “all necessary and
appropriate force” by the President,103 and the President exercised this
authority. This exercise of power should not be set aside without some
level of deference because there exists no “clear conviction that [their
decisions] are in violation of the Constitution.”104
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Supra pt. III(A)(1).
See e.g. Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214.
97
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25.
98
Id.
99
Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 299-300 (1944).
100
Id. at 300.
101
Authorization for Use of Military Force, supra n. 14.
102
See supra pt. III(A)(1).
103
Authorization for Use of Military Force, supra n. 14.
104
Supra n. 97-98 and accompanying text.
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The Exhaustion Doctrine as a Viable Solution

While deference to the Executive is constitutionally and historically
justified, courts still have the responsibility to protect the civil liberties of
the detainees and must not completely “abdicate their responsibility.”105
Deference with oversight of the detainees’ civil liberties could have been
accomplished by adopting a long-standing doctrine in habeas cases:
exhaustion of remedies.
1.

The Origins of Exhaustion

The Supreme Court first established the exhaustion doctrine106 in
Ex parte Royall.107 The exhaustion doctrine requires that a person who is
deprived of his liberty by the state exhaust all available remedies under
state law, in state courts, as a prerequisite to obtaining federal habeas
relief.108 Based on notions of federalism, the Royall Court, in creating the
exhaustion doctrine, stated that “the forbearance which courts of coordinate jurisdiction, administered under a single system, exercise towards
each other, whereby conflicts are avoided, by avoiding interference with the
process of the other, is a principle of comity109. . . . It is a principle of right
and of law, and, therefore, of necessity.”110 To ensure compliance with
these “principle[s] of right and of law,”111 the exhaustion doctrine was
created by the courts and later codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).112 The
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Scheindlin, supra n. 2, at 816.
David B. Levendusky, Annotation: Exhaustion of State Remedies as Condition of Issuance by
Federal Court of Writ of Habeas Corpus for Release of State Prisoner – Supreme Court Cases, 54 L.
Ed. 2d 873, § 2, (2004).
107
117 U.S. 241 (1886).
108
O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999) (stating, “[b]efore a federal court may grant habeas
relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court. In other words, the state
prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to
a federal court in a habeas petition.”).
109
Comity is defined as “the informal and voluntary recognition by courts of one jurisdiction of the laws
and judicial decisions of another.” Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law 85 (Merriam-Webster, Inc.
1996).
110
Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. at 252.
111
Id.
112
O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 842; 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) (reading, in part, as follows: “State custody;
remedies in Federal courts (a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court
shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States. (b) (1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears
that−(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or (B) (i) there is
an absence of available State corrective process; or (ii) circumstances exist that render such process
ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant. (2) An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be
denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the
courts of the State. (3) A State shall not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement or be
estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless the State, through counsel, expressly waives the
requirement. (c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the
courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to
raise, by any available procedure, the question presented. (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus
on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with
respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the
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exhaustion doctrine has been invoked by courts petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus by prisoners held under state authority as a means of paying
deference to the power of state governments.113 With few adjustments, the
principles and rationale that support this doctrine could also support a
decision requiring the Guantanamo detainees to exhaust their remedies
under international law.
2.

Justification for Requiring Exhaustion in Rasul as a Prerequisite for
Habeas Relief

The authority to grant habeas relief is discretionary.114 In Urquhart
v. Brown, the Court stated that although the courts of the United States have
the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to one held in custody in
violation of the Constitution or of any treaty or law of the United States,
such authority is discretionary.115 Since habeas relief is discretionary, the
Rasul Court could have checked their authority and deferred to those
specifically authorized in military affairs.
Although specifically applicable to exhaustion of state remedies by
state prisoners, the same rationale and principles underlying the exhaustion
doctrine would support its conversion to require the Rasul petitioners to
exhaust remedies available under international law or by military tribunal.
The rationale for the exhaustion doctrine is based on the principle of
federal-state comity, whereby federal courts defer to the jurisdiction or
power of state courts.116 The concept of separation of powers has a similar
rationale as justification; comity amongst the co-equal branches of
government. The statement117 made by the Royall Court in support of the
exhaustion doctrine could apply almost word for word in support of the
principle of separation of powers: “the forbearance which courts of coordinate jurisdiction administered under a single system, exercise towards
each other, whereby conflicts are avoided, by avoiding interference with the
process of each other, is a principle of comity . . . . It is a principle of right
and of law, and, therefore, of necessity.”118
Additionally, prisoners tried under the authority of military
tribunals have been subject to exhaustion requirements. In Noyd v. Bond,
the Court held that “habeas corpus petitions from military prisoners should
not be entertained by federal civilian courts until all available remedies

adjudication of the claim−(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding”).
113
Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. at 251-52.
114
Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S. 179, 181 (1907).
115
Levendusky, supra n. 106, at § 3; Urquhart, 205 U.S. at 181.
116
Supra pt. III(B)(1).
117
Supra n. 110 and accompanying text.
118
Royall, 117 U.S. at 252 (quoting Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176, 182 (1884)).
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within the military court system have been invoked in vain.”119 Since
granting habeas relief is discretionary, and since the rationale for the
exhaustion doctrine rests upon concerns that are similar to the idea of
separation of powers, an idea which underlies judicial deference, the
adoption of an exhaustion requirement is a justifiable compromise.
3.

Availability of Remedies Under International Law

Although the detainees have been classified as enemy
combatants120 rather than prisoners of war, the government has recognized
that the petitioners have recourse under international law. The United
States has maintained that the detainees would be treated as if they were
covered by international law dealing with prisoners of war and that
international law remains “a viable means to address the claims” brought by
petitioners.121
a.

Diplomatic Channels

It is the position of the government that other countries will play a
role, under international law, in determining the scope of rights to which
detainees are entitled.122 Diplomatic channels are already at work.123
Australia has used diplomatic means for addressing the detention of David
Hicks, an Australian citizen, captured and detained in Afghanistan by the
Northern Alliance124 and subsequently transferred into the custody of the
United States.125 The Attorney General of Australia has been involved.126
Australia has indicated that the detention of Hicks is appropriate while
Australia works through the complex legal issues and investigates
further.127
b.

Geneva Conventions

The Third Geneva Convention applies in “any . . . armed conflict,”
even if one of the powers is not a party to the convention.128 Under the
Third Geneva Convention, Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters would be covered
as “[m]embers of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a
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395 U.S. 683, 693 (1969).
See supra n. 23 (for definition of enemy combatant).
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Rasul II, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 57. During oral arguments the government stated, “there’s a body of
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122
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Id. at 57.
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125
Rasul II, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 57; Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2691.
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Rasul II, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 57.
127
Id.
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Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War pt. 1, art. 2 (Aug. 12, 1949) 6
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government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.”129
Under the Third Geneva Convention, detainees have a right to have their
status determined by tribunal.130
Since the petitioners have remedies available under international
law, the adoption of the exhaustion doctrine could apply.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Rasul did not consider the effect of their
holding on the ability of the United States to conduct military operations in
the war on terror and all future conflicts that the United States finds itself
involved. The Court spent most of their time looking to the past instead of
considering the future. After an exhaustive lesson about the origins of
habeas relief, and a detailed look at the nature of a lease signed over 100
years ago, the Court concluded that jurisdiction to hear petitioner’s habeas
claims rests in the district courts of the United States without considering
another concept with historical justification: judicial deference to the
executive. Since the early days of our Nation, the Court has recognized the
necessity of allowing the political branches of government to operate with
more freedom in the area of warfare. Why, after the most devastating
terrorist attacks in the history of the United States, does the Court not pay
any attention to such an important policy?
The decision will unfortunately affect the safety of troops on the
ground in the present, and the safety of the nation in the future. Due to the
ruling in Rasul, the government has accelerated its review of the
Guantanamo detainees. The one opportunity for deliberative decisions
during wartime has been erased. With their hand forced by the Court,
several detainees have been released only to continue their crusade against
the United States and more generally, against freedom of all people around
the world.
If the Court was so focused on history, it could have reached into
prior case law and concepts which limit the right of habeas relief in order to
find the “middle road,” and providing deference while maintaining a
watchful eye over the detainees’ civil liberties. The exhaustion doctrine
would have been a good “middle road” to travel.
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